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ABSTRACT
Bayesian probability problems are notoriously difficult for people to solve
accurately. Base rate neglect refers to the hypothesis that people ignore base
rate information in preference for individuating information when making these
probability judgments (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). Correct answers to base
rate neglect problems often require complex Bayesian calculations involving
probability information embedded within realistic event descriptions. The past
research emphasis on base rate neglect responses for such problems has
overlooked the fact that responses can actually vary widely across participants
and within participants from one problem to the next. The verbal protocol
analyses of participants’ decision making processes found in the current study
revealed that participants use a variety of cognitive strategies to solve such
problems. The between-participant and within-participant variability can result
from simple miscalculations to difficulties with translating probability
statements into numerical calculations. This translation process can be further
complicated by idiosyncratic subjective interpretations of the event
descriptions and a basic misunderstanding of objective probability information.
The results of the current study highlight that improving an individual’s
Bayesian reasoning requires the instructional procedure to be tailored to their
sources of difficulties, and that individual protocol analyses could help define
these instructional procedures.
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1
Bayesian mind: Making sense of probability-based decision making strategies
In 1956, Herbert Simon challenged the traditional view of rational decision
making which assumed that decision makers have access to the complete information and
can recognize consequences of each alternative course of action, as well as, choose to
maximize utility or gain. Simon proposed an alternative “bounded rationality” view that
described human beings with limited time, knowledge, and computational capabilities to
make complex decisions. Simon viewed human decision makers as seeking satisfactory
decisions rather than optimal ones. As a result, Simon’s theoretical and research approach
focused on the cognitive processes by which people actually make their decisions. This
approach was to dominate decision making research for the next 60 years and is integral
to the present thesis.
Bayesian Reasoning and Base Rate Neglect
Around the same time as Simon was establishing his research program on general
decision making and problem solving, Meehl and Rosen (1955) had come to a similar
conclusion, and reported that clinical psychologists tended to make clinical predictions
based on subjective intuitions rather than mathematical-supported data. Meehl and Rosen
emphasized the importance of base rate data for evaluating the accuracy of psychometric
devices, but also noted, that unfortunately base rate information was rarely reported in the
literature. Meehl and Rosen made the strong argument that a lack of ability to figure out
base rates is the main reason for people disregarding them, and consequently, they urged
researchers to collect base rate information, as well as, false negative and false positive
rates for psychological tests. They believed that decisions based on this additional
objective information would lead to improved clinical decision making. They also

2
highlighted the use of Bayesian probability formulae to calculate correct judgments based
on these data. Their approach highlighted a prescriptive approach for overcoming the
bounded rationality inherent to human decision making. Unfortunately, this long standing
prescription is still ignored by most people as they rely heavily on their own intuitive
decision making skills for the most part, do not involve objective sources of data or
mathematical calculations.
Many real-world decisions involve evidence-based judgments regarding the
predicted likelihood of an event after incorporating new evidence (e.g., Bayes’ Theorem).
The mathematical presentation of Bayes’ Theorem is as follows:
𝑃(𝐴|𝐵) =

𝑃(𝐵|𝐴) × 𝑃(𝐴)
𝑃(𝐵|¬𝐴) ×𝑃(¬𝐴)+𝑃(𝐵|𝐴) ×𝑃(𝐴)

.

(1)

P(A) and P(A) refer to the base rate probabilities of event A occurring (e.g.,
have cancer) and event A not occurring (e.g., don’t have cancer). P(B|A) is the
conditional probability of a related event B (e.g., positive mammogram test result)
occurring when event A is true (e.g., person has cancer), whereas P(B|A) is the
conditional probability of event B (e.g., positive mammogram test result) occurring when
event A is not true (e.g., person does not have cancer). These values provide new
evidence regarding the likelihood of event A occurring. Finally, P(A|B) is the updated
probability of event A occurring (e.g., person has cancer) if event B is true (e.g., positive
mammogram test result). This value results from the combined sources of base rate
information and individuating test information. Unfortunately, when people are faced
with these decisions in daily life they rarely follow these normative steps for making their
final judgments (Azjen, 1977; Bar-Hillel, 1980; Edwards, 1968; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage,
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1995; Hammerton, 1973; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Krynski & Tenenbaum, 2007;
Lyon & Slovic; 1976; McNair & Feeney, 2014; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982).
Edwards (1968) was the first to report that people do not make correct Bayesian
decisions, and that they act very conservatively when adjusting their prior belief (base
rate) after given new evidence. Edwards tested this claim by giving his participants the
following Bayesian reasoning problem: “There are two book bags, one containing 700
red and 300 blue chips, the other containing 300 red and 700 blue. Take one of the bags.
Now, you sample, randomly, with replacement after each chip. In 12 samples, you get 8
reds and 4 blues. What is the probability that this is the predominantly red bag?” The
correct Bayesian answer is 0.97, but most of Edward’s participants chose 0.70 as their
answer. This conservatism correction highlighted the difficulties people have solving
Bayesian reasoning problems.
But it was the very influential series of papers by Kahneman and Tversky in the
1970s that not only expanded on Simon’s bounded rationality work but also further
highlighted the importance of examining how people really make their decisions. They
proposed that people used cognitive “heuristics” to make satisfactory judgments that
overcame their limited cognitive capacity for fully processing the complex amounts of
decision information inherent to many real world decisions. They argued that intuitive
judgment processes are not quantitatively simpler than normative models, but rather that
they fall into a different qualitative category of processing. They also speculated that a
heuristic approach to making decisions would also lead to predictable biases in the final
decisions. This early work of Kahneman and Tversky focused on three general heuristics:
(1) availability, (2) representativeness, and (3) adjustment and anchoring.
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The representative heuristic was proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1972) to
explain why base rate information was often neglected when making decisions (base rate
neglect). Their initial definition of the representative heuristic was that people assess
probability information for an uncertain event by “the degree to which an event is similar
in essential characteristics to its parent population and reflects the salient features of the
process by which that probability information is generated” (Kahneman & Tversky,
1972, p. 431). Kahneman and Tversky (1973) illustrated the use of this heuristic with a
decision problem that is now referred to as the ‘Engineer and Lawyer Problem’. They
gave their participants a brief personality descriptions of several individuals who were
randomly drawn from either a group made up of 70 engineers and 30 lawyers or a group
made up of 30 engineers and 70 lawyers. Participants were required to determine the
probability for each description that it belonged to an engineer rather than to a lawyer.
For example, “Jack is a 45-year-old man. He is married and has four children. He is
generally conservative, careful, and ambitious. He shows no interest in political and
social issues and spends most of his free time on his many hobbies which include home
carpentry, sailing, and mathematical puzzles. What is the probability that Jack is one of
the 30 engineers in the sample?” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973, p. 241). Kahneman and
Tversky found that participants gave the same probability judgments for both group
conditions, and that a specific description of an engineer lead participants to ignore prior
probabilities (i.e., base rate information). In fact, participants even ignored prior
probabilities when they were given specific but irrelevant evidence (e.g., marital status
and reputation at work). However, when participants were not presented with the specific

5
personality descriptions, participants correctly used the prior probabilities (i.e. base rates)
to make their judgments.
Tversky and Kahneman (1982) also presented participants with a more complex
Bayesian problem that described a common real world problem where prior evidence
(e.g., base rate information) is updated with new evidence (e.g., individuating
information) to provide an accurate probability judgment of an outcome. In their study,
participants were given the following scenario to read (now known as the ‘Taxi Cab
Problem’): “A cab was involved in a hit and run accident at night. Two cab companies,
the Green and the Blue, operate in the city. 85% of the cabs in the city are Green and
15% are Blue. A witness identified the cab as Blue. The court tested the reliability of the
witness under the same circumstances that existed on the night of the accident and
concluded that the witness correctly identified each one of the two colors 80% of the time
and failed 20% of the time. What is the probability that the cab involved in the accident
was Blue rather than Green knowing that this witness identified it as Blue?” (p. 156-157).
Tversky and Kahneman (1982) reported that the modal answer obtained from participants
was 80% for the Taxi Cab problem, and this result again highlighted the common
practice of neglecting base rate information. Other researchers quickly replicated this
finding (Bar-Hillel, 1980; Lyon & Slovic, 1976), and Bar-Hillel (1980) even suggested
that base rate neglect should be considered a “matter of established fact” (Bar-Hillel,
1980, p. 215). However, Bar-Hillel also noted that the representative heuristic
explanation Kahneman and Tversky provided for their Engineer and Lawyer problem did
not apply as well to the more complex Taxi Cab problem.
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Consequently, Tversky and Kahneman (1977, 1980) proposed an alternative
causal schema explanation for the neglect of base rate information with the taxi cab
problem, which has its origins in the causal interpretations proposed by Ajzen (1977).
Ajzen argued that people look for causal links for events or behaviors, and therefore
participants’ predictions will be influenced by whether the given information suggest
casual factors or not. He proposed that even statistically relevant normative information
will be neglected if it is not causally significant, and that this information is mainly used
when no causal model can be represented. Ajzen explained the engineer and lawyer
problem findings as resulting from a population base rate for each occupation that did not
cause any member of the sample to be related to either job whereas the specific
descriptions (e.g., traits, ability, and others) of the individuals did provide casually
significant information.
In response to Ajzen’s argument regarding the causal relevance of the information
provided in such problems, Tversky and Kahneman (1977) revised the role of the
representative heuristic to be overridden by a casual interpretation, if such an
interpretation was readily available. For example, when Tversky and Kahneman (1977)
changed the base rate information for the Taxi Cab problem to now describe the
frequency of previous accidents “Although the two companies are roughly equal in size,
85% of cab accidents in the city involve Green cabs, and 15% involve Blue cabs” (p. 31),
the proportion of base rate neglect answers was significantly decreased. They also found
such causal details were directional in that this information was more influential than
diagnostic data, and that causal details were also specific in their influence and only
considered when they fit the causal schema.
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More recently, Krynski and Tenenbaum (2007) found further support for a causal
explanation for base rate neglect in Bayesian reasoning. They argued that people make
use of valuable causal knowledge to make accurate judgments in daily life, and that it is
hard to highlight this in traditional laboratory experiments. They often observed base rate
information was neglected by participants when given a typical Bayesian problem (e.g.,
mammogram test that detects breast cancers), but when they provided a reason for why
this test might produce an erroneous false positive result (e.g., due to harmless benign
cyst), the proportion of base rate neglect answers decreased sharply. They suggested that
the addition of this information helped people to set up a causal model to assign
appropriate values for making correct Bayesian judgments.
In fact, Hammerton (1973) had already proposed a similar experiential-based
explanation for the general neglect of probability information by participants when given
such problems to solve. Hammerton presented the following Bayesian problem to his
participants:
1. A device has been invented for screening a population for a disease known as
psylicrapitis.
2. The device is a very good one, but not perfect.
3. If someone is a sufferer, there is a 90% chance that he will be recorded
positively.
4. If he is not a sufferer, there is still a 1% chance that he will be recorded
positively.
5. Roughly 1% of the population has the disease.
6. Mr. Smith has been tested and the result is positive. (p. 252).

8
His participants consistently estimated a much higher probability than the actual answer
of around 48%. Changing the order in which the information was presented and taking
out some of the probability information did not remove this response bias. However,
when Hammerton changed the description of the problem to a mechanical device which
screens engine parts for internal cracks, his participants now estimated much lower
probabilities (65%). Hammerton believed that participants had rigid prior expectations
regarding the infallibility of medical diagnostic tests, and that their previous experiences
could influence the degree to which case-specific information could affect their
probability judgments. Hammerton’s explanation for base rate neglect is not based on a
lacking or faulty causal schema as proposed by Kahneman and Tversky, but rather the
influence of personal experiences and beliefs for subjectively accepting or rejecting
objective sources of probability information.
However, the prior expectations explanation proposed by Hammerton was
criticized by Lyon and Slovic (1976) because there are surely no rigid prior evidence
from a typical participant’s experiences about witness identification infallibility that
would be expected for the classic Taxicab problem. Lyon and Slovic (1976) compared
the Taxicab problem with a similar structure involving a different context (a machine to
detect light bulb failure). They did not find a problem context effect, but support from a
null hypothesis prediction is hardly a strong case for rejecting Hammerton’s explanation.
However, as the current thesis will highlight, making broad theoretical conclusions based
on the answers alone provided by participants in these kind of tasks is also fraught with
possible confounds. The current thesis will highlight the theoretical benefit of allowing
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multiple explanations to play a role in accounting for the variety of responses possible for
complex Bayesian decision problems.
Bar-Hillel (1980) pointed out that the causality argument is an incomplete
explanation, because the causality argument accounts for when base rates will be ignored
but not why base rates will be ignored. She argued that the relevance of the base rate
information determines whether people would use this information, and that causal
relevance was a special case of relevance. Bar-Hillel proposed that relevance is the main
factor why people ignore base rate information, because they view base rate information
as irrelevant. She conducted a number of experiments using multiple Bayesian problems
in different contexts (e.g., Taxicab accident, suicide, and dreaming), and she found that
participants only integrated the two sources of information (base rate and individuating)
when both sources of information are equally relevant. She also suggested that providing
participants with multiple Bayesian problems will help highlight the relevance of both
sources of information. This notion of relevance was never clearly defined by Bar-Hillel,
but it does seem to relate to both prior expectations and causal schemas. However, as you
will see later when the current study examines within-participant variability in Bayesian
reasoning responses, relevance of the two sources of information does not appear to occur
naturally with practice.
The previous research suggests that emphasizing the relevance (especially causal
relevance) of the two sources of information when solving Bayesian reasoning problems
will overcome the base rate neglect bias. However Gigerenzer and colleagues suggest
that additional cognitive difficulties still need to be overcome when making these
decisions. They argue that the main reason why Bayesian reasoning is so difficult for
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human participants to perform is because the human mind was not designed to process
information in a probability format (Gigerenzer, 1996; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995).
Gigerenzer (1996) suggested that natural frequencies are easier to process because of our
evolutionary history for dealing with naturally occurring frequency data. Gigerenzer also
argued that presenting information in natural frequencies gives people more information
about the size of a certain reference class, and therefore, helps participants make
inferences that more closely resemble the normative Bayesian approach.
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) gave their participants multiple Bayesian
problems to solve that were presented in either frequency or standard probability formats.
The following Bayesian problem highlights how frequency information differs from
probability information: “10 out of every 1,000 women at age forty who participate in
routine screening have breast cancer. 8 of every 10 women with breast cancer will get a
positive mammography. 95 out of every 990 women without breast cancer will also get a
positive mammography. Here is a new representative sample of women at age forty who
received a positive mammography in routine screening. How many of these women do
you expect to actually have breast cancer? ___ out of ___.” (p. 688). They found that the
number of participants who gave correct (or close to correct) Bayesian answers was 16%
for problems presented to participants using the probability format, whereas 46% of the
participants provided correct answers to problems presented using a natural frequency
format. This is a substantial improvement in Bayesian reasoning, but we should highlight
that even after this change in format, over 50% of these Bayesian problems are still being
calculated incorrectly. Again highlighting that more than one explanation is needed to
account for the variability in participants’ responses with Bayesian reasoning tasks.
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Lewis and Keren (1999) also pointed out that the frequency argument posed by
Gigerenzer has a major confound when comparing probability and frequency formats; the
use of joint versus conditional data presentation in given sampling information. They
argued data presented in frequency format (e.g., 10 out of every 1000 women have
cancer, 8 of every 10 women with cancer get positive test results, and 95 out of every 990
women without cancer get positive test results) was much easier to comprehend and
compute as it described events as jointly occurring, whereas conditional statements were
used to describing problems in probability format (e.g., 10 out of 1000 women have
cancer, 800 out of 1000 women with cancer get positive test results, and 96 out of 1000
women without cancer get positive test results).
Ayal and Beyth-Maron (2014) suggested that the main difference between these
arguments derived from the different number of mental steps individuals needed to
compute in each case. They manipulated the number of computations needed to solve a
typical Bayesian problem (1 to 4) and the type of data presentation used for each problem
(frequency versus probability). For example, some participants only needed to calculate
the final computation in the Bayesian calculations whereas other participants needed to
calculate three additional earlier computations in the sequence of Bayesian calculations.
When participants only needed one calculation, the correct answer was provided 55.2%
of the time when the problem’s information was presented in a frequency format,
whereas only 32.3% of the problems were calculated successfully when the probability
format was given. This finding supports Gigerenzer’s natural frequencies argument.
However, this advantage in performance was diminished with each additional mental
computation required. When participants needed to correctly make four computations, the
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difference in the success rate between the two formats was less than 4% (10% for
frequency format vs. 13.8% for probability format). These findings are a problem for
Gigerenzer’s frequency explanation because this proposition assumes that the frequency
advantage should be greater when more computations are required, but this was not found
to be the case. These results suggest that there are more challenges for participants when
performing these computations than just the format of the data representation.
One Explanation or Many
When Bar-Hillel (1980) replicated the classic ‘Taxicab’ problem, she found that
only about 10% of her participants gave the normative Bayesian probability answer while
another 36% of participants ignored base rate information (i.e., base rate neglect). The
other 54% of her participants made non-normative answers which could not be explained
by base rate neglect. Many participants gave judgments that defied any clear logical or
mathematical computations. This wide range of non-normative judgments even results
for highly educated individuals and individuals with strong numeracy skills (Lipkus,
Samsa, & Rimer, 2001; McNair & Feeney, 2014), and is typical for all previous research
involving Bayesian reasoning (refer to Figure 1 for additional examples). But past
research on Bayesian reasoning has typically focused on a single explanation for the nonnormative judgments made by participants, and researchers have ignored other nonexplained responses, even when these responses constituted the majority of cases. This
point is further illustrated by the attempts of researchers to improve Bayesian reasoning,
such as by providing causal information (Kahneman & Tversky, 1980; Krynski and
Tenenbaum, 2007) or by providing information in a frequency format (Gigerenzer &
Hoffrage, 1995). Although these attempts have been successful at improving the success
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rates for Bayesian calculations, the majority of participants in these studies still do not
show any benefits from these experimental manipulations. Research is needed that does a
better job of describing the many different ways that participants approach Bayesian
reasoning problems, and with this knowledge, researchers will be better able to target
specific interventions to combat biases that result from these differences.
After synthesizing the results from previous research on Bayesian reasoning, it is
evident that the range of responses that result reflect the interaction between an
individual’s subjective, intuitive reasoning and the individual’s ability to perform the
necessary computations. Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) alluded to this interaction
when they stated that “Maybe the mind does a little of both Bayesian computation and
quick-and-dirty inference.” (p. 685). Unfortunately, they also concluded that
incorporating both perspectives would make very little theoretical progress because they
believed this would just compromise or weaken the two different viewpoints. Gigerenzer
and Hoffrage also argued those viewpoints were incomplete because they focused on
cognitive processes not cognitive algorithm (frequency or probability) and information
format. The findings of the current study will reveal that incorporating both perspectives
is actually the best way forward for understanding the theoretical underpinnings of
Bayesian reasoning, as well as prescribing methods for improving Bayesian reasoning
skills in the general population.
Between-participant and Within-participant Variability
The literature review presented so far highlights the considerable variability in
judgments made by participants when given a single Bayesian decision problem
(between-participant variability). However, this is not the only source of variability when
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examining Bayesian reasoning. When participants are given multiple Bayesian problems
there is also evidence of within-participant variability in their responses.
Byun and Ball (2015) presented 110 participants with nine Bayesian reasoning
problems to solve. Each Bayesian problem described different real world events that a
person could experience, but the probability information provided for each problem was
designed to be numerically quite similar. As expected from previous research with such
problems, a wide range of answers were provided for each and every problem (betweenparticipant variability). The wide distribution in responses are highlighted for a sample of
problems in Figure 2. In addition, Byun and Ball found that the overall distribution of
responses could differ from one problem to the next even though the probability
information was very similar in each case. This finding suggested that perhaps there was
some degree of within-participant variability in the responses provided by the same
participant to different Bayesian problems.
To highlight this within-participant variability in responses, Byun and Ball (2015)
mathematically calculated measures of response inconsistency across the nine Bayesian
problems using known response types for comparisons (e.g., correct answer, base rate
neglect answer). They found that some participants use a consistent probability based
strategy (i.e., very low response inconsistency) even if their answers were generally
incorrect. Other participants provided such large response inconsistency scores that a
common probability-based strategy was unlikely to have been used by these participants
(refer to Figure 3). In fact, more than half of the participants showed these inconsistent
response patterns, suggesting that within-participant variability can also account for the
wide range of answers typically found with Bayesian reasoning tasks. Unfortunately, it is
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very difficult to determine a participant’s specific judgment strategy when researchers
only have the participants’ answers to determine these strategies.
One possible explanation for these two sources of variability could still be that the
mathematical computations undertaken by the participants are so incorrect that they could
produce substantial variability in responses (even across problems). To test this
explanation, Byun and Ball (2015) also provided their participants with the classic
Taxicab problem and asked their participants to specifically calculate each computational
step of this Bayesian problem by isolating each verbal description for that probability
calculation. The percentage of correct answers decreased as participants moved from one
computation to the next, and the number of answers given by participants for each
computation quickly multiplied (refer to Table 1). These results suggest that many
participants have considerable trouble translating verbal probability descriptions into
numerical calculations, and that early miscalculations could combine to compound the
variability in the final answers obtained. If this is the case, however, one would expect
that the participant’s numeracy ability (Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001; Lipkus & Peters,
2009) or cognitive reasoning ability (Frederick, 2005) would successfully predict each
participant’s ability to successfully complete each computational step.
The Numeracy scale was developed by Lipkus, Samsa, and Rimer (2001) to
measure the numerical capabilities necessary for performing the mathematical operations
inherent to probability calculations. The three item Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) was
developed by Frederick (2005) to assess the ability of an individual to suppress an
intuitive, heuristic (but wrong) response in favor of a reflective, analytical (correct)
response. Researchers have found the CRT to correlate with an individual's’ knowledge
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of statistical concepts (Obrecht, Chapman, & Gelman, 2007) and tendency to produced
biased responses, such as the gambler’s fallacy and outcome bias (Toplak, West, &
Stanovich, 2011).
Byun and Ball (2015) incorporated the Numeracy scale and a two-item version of
the CRT in their study. They found significant correlations for these measures with the
performance of participants on the early computation steps of the Taxi Cab problem
(refer to Table 1). However, as the computation steps became more complex, these
correlations became smaller and non-significant predictors of computational success
(refer to Table 1). These findings highlight that computational calculations (or more
appropriately – miscalculations) do play a role in explaining the variability of participant
responses, but these findings also suggest that other factors could play a role in the
unaccounted response variability.
Verbal Protocol Analysis
The goal of the current study was to fully explain the sources of variability in
Bayesian reasoning that is evident in typical base rate neglect problems. Previous
explanations are based solely on the answers provided by participants to usually one
Bayesian problem. However, there are different ways of coming up with the same
incorrect answers, and these answers cannot clearly depict a misstep or miscalculation in
the computation process. Our goal was to examine the thought processes that participant
followed when attempting to solve complex Bayesian decision problems. Verbal or thinkaloud protocols have been used successfully in the past to examine the cognitive
processes and strategies used by participants when making decisions (e.g., Ball,
Langholtz, Auble, & Sopchak, 1998). The verbal protocol procedure requires the

17
participant to speak out aloud their thought processes as they make their decisions or
solve problems (concurrent verbal protocol), or speak out aloud their thought processes
after they have provided their decision or answer (retrospective verbal protocol).
However, researchers have raised concerns that the verbal protocol methodology could
affect the thought processes of the participant or inadequately elicit all of the thoughts
that went into making a decision or solving a problem (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).
Regardless of these concerns, the verbal protocol procedure still allowed us to conduct
the first detailed analysis of the cognitive processes involved in Bayesian reasoning.
Consequently, a much richer source of individual data will be provided in this study than
has been achieved in past research that has relied on the participant’s final answers as the
sole source of their research conclusions.
Pilot research was conducted to establish the best verbal protocol procedure when
examining Bayesian reasoning. The concurrent verbal protocol procedure was rejected by
the experimenters because it interfered too much when solving these complex,
information laden problems. The retrospective protocol procedure did not interfere with
the thought processes needed to solve such problems, and also provided good data when
the protocol was undertaken as soon as possible after the participant provided their
answer. We also found that additional verbal prompts provided by the experimenter after
the retrospective protocol data was collected, could also help pinpoint the use or non-use
of probability information when solving each problem. We hypothesized that the
strategies participants use to solve Bayesian reasoning problems will vary in the type of
(probability and story) information they use and how they use this information.
Furthermore, we speculated that the reasons for these differences (between-participant
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and within-participant) will be a function of their subjective interpretation of the
Bayesian problem’s story context and their ability to perform the necessary mathematical
computations. Participants will vary in the relative influence of these factors, and we
hope to document where these factors will influence the reasoning processes during each
participant’s computations.
Method
Participants
Thirty-four undergraduate students (17 male and 17 female) at the College of
William & Mary participated in this experiment for course credit. We omitted data from
three participants who were not native English speakers. The final sample of 31
participants consisted of 15 men and 16 women with a mean age of 18.61 years (SD =
1.02).
Apparatus
The experimenter sat in front of a computer and controlled the experiment using
Microsoft PowerPoint. Participants sat in front of a second monitor connected to the
experimenter’s computer. A standing screen separated the experimenter from the
participant so no visual contact between the two people was possible. A microphone was
placed next to the monitor and in front of the participant, and the participant’s verbal
responses were recorded using the Audacity software. Participants were provided with a
pen and scratch paper if they needed to write down any calculations.
Procedure
After the participant provided Informed Consent, the think-aloud Bayesian
reasoning task was presented by the computer to each participant. The computer
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presented the instructions for performing the task: “In this experiment, you are going to
read three scenarios that describe real world decisions people are faced with making.
Many decisions like these, require us to incorporate probability information in our
decision making. Please treat each decision as seriously as you would if each decision
scenario applied to you or a close family member or friend.”
Participants were asked to solve three Bayesian reasoning problems which were
adapted from the problems used by McNair and Feeney (2014). The problem descriptions
were edited by the author to make them more realistic to the participants and appear less
like mathematical problems. The descriptions and images presented for each problem are
displayed in Figure 4.
After the participant gave their answer to each of the three problems, the
following retrospective verbal protocol instructions were provided: “Now we would like
you to go back through each decision problem and explain your thought processes in
coming up with each answer. Please tell the experimenter in as much as detail as
possible the thoughts that came to mind during this decision making process, no matter
how relevant or important they may sound to you now. Please tell us what you were
thinking about when you read the specific items of information (numerical and nonnumerical) that make up each decision problem. Please explain the thoughts that went
into interpreting each problem and how you used the probability information provided to
solve the problem. Please try to provide as much detail as you can regarding the thinking
you followed from the start to the end of the mental decision making steps you
undertook.” To facilitate this recall, the participant was presented with the same problem
descriptions again (refer to Figure 4) with an additional instruction displayed at the
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bottom of each problem: “Please describe all of your thought processes.” If the
participant did not say anything about their use or non-use of the specific probability
information provided for each problem, the experimenter prompted them with specific
questions about whether they had used that information and why they did or did not use
this information. After the participant provided their verbal protocol for each problem,
the experimenter asked the participant to rate the credibility of the probability
information provided for each problem (0 = not credible to 7 = very credible) and to rate
how realistic they found the description of the situation (0 = not realistic to 7 = very
realistic). The order of the three Bayesian problems was counterbalanced across the
participants. The experiment took approximately 30 minutes to complete.
Data Coding
The recorded verbal descriptions (including answers to prompts) provided by the
participants were then transcribed. The transcriptions were segmented to highlight
statements that related to the thought processes involved in making their judgments.
These statements were coded for content that related to subjective interpretations of the
information provided and for content that related to objective use of the probability
information provided. An example of a segmented transcript from a participant and the
coding that resulted for this transcript is provided in Figure 5. The reliability of the
content analysis was tested by using two coders to code the same random sample of
transcripts, and the inter-coder agreement approached 100% agreement.
Results
Answers
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The current study provided a similar patterns of responses as reported previously
by Byun and Ball (2015) when giving participants multiple Bayesian probability
problems to answer (refer to Figure 6). The large number of answers and the wide range
of values provided for the Pregnancy Test problem (number of answers = 15; range of
answers = .16 – 90%), the Sniffer Dog problem (number of answers = 16; range of
answers = 1.4 – 90%), and the Spam E-mail problem (number of answers = 20; range of
answers = .08 – 100%) are consistent with the findings of Byun and Ball (2015). The
base rate neglect answer for each problem was not the modal answer provided by
participants as is often found in previous research (Bar-Hillel, 1980; Byun & Ball, 2015;
Cohen & Staub, 2015; Krynski & Tenenbaum, 2007; McNair & Feeney, 2014, 2015).
Realism and Credibility of Problem Descriptions
The realism ratings of the event descriptions for the Pregnancy Test problem (M =
5.00, SD = 1.77), Sniffer Dog problem (M = 4.97, SD = 1.78), and Spam E-mail problem
(M = 4.52, SD = 1.63) were all above the mid-point for this scale (3.5), suggesting that
the majority of the participants believed these events were similar to those experienced in
real life. In addition, the participants’ ratings of the credibility of the probability
information provided for the Pregnancy Test problem (M = 5.34, SD = 1.70), the Spam Email problem (M = 5.06, SD = 1.32), and the Sniffer Dog problem (M = 4.39, SD = 1.50)
were also above the mid-point for this scale (3.5), suggesting that most participants also
found the probability values to be consistent with what they would expect for real-life
events of these types.
Correct Bayesian Reasoning
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Two participants (6%) used the correct Bayesian reasoning steps to calculate all
three of their answers. These participants did not provide subjective interpretations of
event information, and provided the necessary probability calculations given by Bayes
Theorem (refer to Figure 7). One participant used the standard probability format in
making these calculations while the other participant converted the probability values to
frequencies before performing their calculations.
There were two other participants who used correct Bayesian calculations for one
problem but not for the other two problems. One of these participants was particularly
interesting, because his data highlights the within-participant variability issues that can
result with complex real-world decision making problems like those used in the current
study. This participant used a very simple intuition-based reasoning approach to give
non-normative answers for the first two problems, but then changed his strategy for the
final problem and used the correct Bayesian calculations for this problem. This
participant clearly had the mathematical knowledge to utilize the normative Bayesian
reasoning procedure, but chose not to do so for the first two problems.
In total, only eight (9%) out of the 93 total problems completed by all participants
were correctly solved by the participants in this study. This result again highlights the
need for a better understanding of the many possible reasons people are not using the
normative Bayesian computations when making these types of decisions.
Incorrect Probability-based Reasoning – Missing or Miscalculated Step(s)
The next group of participants can be categorized into two distinctive sub-groups
who made use of some or all of the probability information provided for each problem,
but then made errors in how they used this information. In the first sub-group, six
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participants (19%) incorporated all of the probability information provided in one or
more of the problems, but they combined this information incorrectly when calculating
their final answers (refer to Figure 8). Some examples of miscalculations used by these
participants are: using (P(H) + P(¬H))P(D|H) instead of P(¬H)P(D|H), and using
(P(H)P(H|D)) / (P(¬H)P(H|¬D)) instead of (P(H)P(H|D)) / (P(H)P(H|D) +
P(¬H)P(H|¬D)).
The other group of three participants (10%) correctly calculated P(¬H),
P(H)P(D|H), and P(¬H)P(D|¬H) in at least one of the problems, but they then selected
one of the conditional probability values as their final answer (refer to Figure 9). These
participants often had a problem seeing that four outcomes are possible when combining
two events (e.g., event 1 = drugs in suitcase and event 2 = dog detects drugs) and involve
‘hits’ (e.g., correct detection of drugs in suitcase), ‘false positives’ (e.g., incorrect
detection of drugs in suitcase), ‘misses’ (e.g., missed detection of drugs in suitcase), and
‘correct rejections’ (e.g., did not detect drugs in suitcase when they were not present).
These participants incorrectly perceived that there were only two outcomes for
combinations of two events (e.g., drugs were present or drugs were not present), and the
two outcomes they chose related to the event they perceived as more important to the
question.
Incorrect Probability-based Reasoning – Failure to Utilize All Information
This group of participants attempted to use some of the probability information to
calculate their answers, but they did not use all of the probability information necessary
to do so correctly (refer to Figure 10). Some stopped too early in their calculations (e.g.,
P(H)P(D|H)) and/or combined probability information in incorrect ways (e.g.,
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P(H)P(¬H), (P(D|H) – P(D|H)P(D|¬H))). Some of these participants even failed to
calculate P(¬H), that is a vital early step in the correct sequence of Bayesian
computations. Eight participants (26%) solved one or more of the problems in this way.
Intuition-based Reasoning Combined with Probability-based Reasoning
Participants in this group only utilized one or two pieces of probability
information as simple guides for making their intuitive judgments. They often incorrectly
rejected sources of probability information as irrelevant (e.g., ‘it involved other people’,
‘it was what happened in the past’, ‘the accuracy of dogs is not relevant’, ‘because they
have made their detection already’). These participants also often incorporated their own
personal beliefs or experiences in making these decisions of relevance (refer to Figure
11). Twenty-one (68%) participants used this approach for at least one of the problems.
Intuition-based Reasoning
The last group of participants often focused on one source of probability
information and then subjectively adjusted it up or down depending on the other source
of probability information. These participants often appeared to infer that the probability
information is only given to simply help them interpret the story (e.g., dogs are accurate –
90% is a good level of accuracy). A couple of participants did not even bother utilizing
any of the probability information; preferring to rely on their own intuitive-judgments of
what this probability should be. They sometimes related the problem to their own
personal experiences without a need to incorporate any of the objective probability
information provided in the problem description (refer to Figure 12). Thirteen
participants (42%) used this very simple approach to determining their answers for at
least one of the problems.
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Discussion
Since Kahneman and Tversky labeled base rate neglect as a cognitive bias in the
1970s, the bias has been regarded as a strong and consistent phenomenon for decades.
The definition of base rate neglect as ‘the neglecting of base rate information in favor of
individuating information’ describes the phenomenon but does not help us understand
why such a bias occurs. In addition, researchers who have investigated this bias have
ignored the wide range of possible answers provided by participants that go beyond the
one described in the previous definition. Base rate neglect answers are often not the most
frequent answer provided by participants in previous research (refer to Figure 1), and
some participants even show the opposite bias by relying solely on base rate information
and neglected the individuating information (refer to Figure 6 for an example from the
current study).
The variability of answers provided across participants when solving these
Bayesian reasoning problems is further compounded by the within-participant variability
in answers when multiple problems are given to participants (Bar-Hillel, 1980; Byun &
Ball, 2015; Cohen & Staub, 2015; McNair & Feeney, 2014, 2015). The base rate
probability information and individuating probability information (hits and false alarms)
are usually varied across problems in these research studies. The values given still satisfy
the general experimental requirement of a low base rate probability for the primary
outcome, [e.g., having cancer P(H)] in comparison to a much larger complementary
probability for the alternative outcome [e.g., not having cancer P(H)]. The
individuating information generally describes a relatively high hit rate for the second
source of information [e.g., positive mammogram test result for women with cancer
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P(D|H)] with a corresponding low false positive rate [e.g., positive mammogram test for
women without cancer P(D|H)]. The event descriptions will usually change from one
problem to the next (e.g., judging cancer likelihood, judging the success of a spam filter)
and can reflect very different real world decision making contexts. Unfortunately, past
research is unclear whether the different answers provided by participants across the
different problems result from consistent or inconsistent use of the same decision making
strategy (Bar-Hillel, 1980; Byun & Ball, 2015; Cohen & Staub, 2015; McNair & Feeney,
2014, 2015).
The current study revealed that both uses are possible. The same decision making
strategy can produce considerable variability in the answers provided by a participant,
while conversely different decision making strategies can produce very little variability in
the answers provided by a participant. For example, one participant gave an answer of
5% for the Sniffer Dog problem by calculating a value that fell between P(H) and P(D|H)
(i.e., did not use base rate information for non-occurrence of H). However, the same
participant used a different calculation strategy for the Spam E-mail problem [P(D|¬H)]
(i.e., only used individuating information for non-occurrence of H) and obtained an
answer of similar magnitude (10%). This participant used another different calculation
for the Pregnancy Test problem [P(H)] (only used base rate information for occurrence of
H) and again provided an answer of similar magnitude (5%). The answers provided by
participants are not a reliable source for researchers to use when distinguishing
participants’ decision making strategies. What researchers need to know is how
participants actually came up with these answers.
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The between- and within-participant variability in answers found in previous
research has been explained by individual differences in numeracy and reasoning abilities
(Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001; Lipkus & Peters, 2009; Frederick 2005). Byun and Ball
(2015) also found that measures of these abilities did correlate weakly with participant
performance at solving early steps of the Bayesian probability calculations. However, one
would expect these relationships to get stronger as the numeracy and reasoning required
for latter steps increased, however Byun and Ball did not find this to be the case (refer to
Table 1). Their findings supplement the results of the current study and suggest a
numeracy-reasoning explanation is not comprehensive enough to explain the betweenand within-participant variability found in Bayesian reasoning responses. In addition, this
explanation does not explain why some participants are more likely to subjectively
interpret the story or relate the story description to their own personal experiences rather
than use the objective probability information provided for each problem.
A more comprehensive model for describing the different points where individual
differences can result in complex Bayesian reasoning tasks is illustrated in Figure 13, and
this model was developed from the verbal protocol analyses conducted in the current
study. This model highlights the importance of distinguishing story interpretation effects
from basic probability calculation mistakes. Consequently, this model goes beyond the
simple numeracy-reasoning explanations provided by other researchers (Azjen, 1977;
Bar-Hillel, 1980; Edwards, 1968; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Hammerton, 1973;
Kaheman & Tversky, 1972, 1973; Krynski & Tenenbaum, 2007; Lyon & Slovic, 1976).
The model depicted in Figure 13 also highlights the difficulties in using a ‘one-methodfits-all’ prescriptive approach to help people perform better (more normative) Bayesian
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reasoning and overcome the common base rate neglect bias (e.g., Gigerenzer & Hoffrage,
1995; Krynski & Tenenbaum, 2007; Siegrist & Keller, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman,
1977, 1980). The current research suggests that a combination of these methods will
work best, and that the methods selected need to be tailored for each participant. The
focus of past research on conclusions based only on participants’ answers has resulted in
researchers overlooking the different needs of different participants when performing
complex Bayesian reasoning.
There were some participants in the current study who relied solely on their own
subjective interpretations of the event descriptions that were independent of the
probability information provided. They either deemed this information to be irrelevant to
the problem or just simply ignored it (see also Bar-Hillel, 1980). The most frequent and
distinguishable reason for neglecting probability information was a faulty understanding
of the spatial and/or temporal relationships between the base rate event and the
individuating event. This neglect hides the important causal relationship connecting these
two events. Some participants viewed the base rate information as involving other people
in different situations from the past, and therefore not relevant to what is happening now
and described by the individuating information. For example, some participants stated
that the fact other people have hidden drugs in their suitcase in the past is irrelevant to
what their friend is going through now. But this is obviously illogical reasoning, because
past statistics often predict future event outcomes. For example, intersections that have a
history of accidents are probably dangerous intersections – why would you ignore the
historical data when you are driving through this intersection? Other participants viewed
the probability information as simply probability-based metaphors for the verbal
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statements describing the event. Just like common probability metaphors in the English
language like “one in a million” is another way of saying an event occurrence is rare or
unlikely, and the statement “fifty fifty” suggests that two outcomes have roughly an equal
probability of occurrence. One participant even relied on these subjective interpretations
even though this participant showed in their last problem calculations that they possess
the probability training to perform the normative Bayesian computations. One possible
way of helping individuals to see the benefits of objective probability information is to
provide them with indicators of the causal relationships between these sources of
probability information and the final decision outcome. This was first suggested by
Tversky and Kahneman (1977, 1980), and later shown by Krynski and Tenenbaum
(2007) to help some participants make better Bayesian judgments. Although, this causal
facilitation effect may only result for highly numerate participants (McNair & Feeney,
2015).
Other participants showed a difficulty translating verbal descriptions into
probability formulae needed for each step of the probability calculations. Previous
research suggests that providing the probability information in terms of natural
frequencies can help participants overcome these difficulties. For example, saying one
women out of 100 women can have cancer while 99 of these women don’t have cancer, is
easier for participants to understand than saying there is a one percent chance of having
cancer in this population (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). Researchers have also found
performance benefits after they provide participants with a visual representation of the
solution (e.g., tree-diagram) (Beitzel & Staley, 2015; Sirota, Kostovičová, & ValléeTourangeau, 2015). These researchers taught participants to perform Bayesian probability
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calculations by providing them with these visual aids, and the researchers found these
improvements to persist over time. Likewise, providing tools (pencil and paper and sets
of cards matching the quantities stated in a Bayesian problem) to participants to help
solve these problems can increase participant interactivity when solving Bayesian
problems that results in improved performance (Vallée-Tourangeau, Abadie, & ValléeTourangeau, 2015). Future research could involve a verbal protocol analysis of each
participant’s initial attempt to solve one Bayesian problem, and then tailor an intervention
training strategy based on the model depicted in Figure 13 to help this participant. This
identification-multi-method approach could be tested against the typical ‘one-methodfits-all’ approach offered in past research (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Krynski &
Tenenbaum, 2007; Siegrist & Keller, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1977, 1980).
The conclusions of the current research were based on retrospective verbal
protocols and this methodology has been criticized in the past for not being completely
objective when analyzing an individual’s though processes (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).
The participant may not be able to provide a verbal description of their thought processes,
or alternatively, they may provide verbal descriptions that they feel match the demand
characteristics of the experiment, especially when answering direct questions about the
use of specific sources of probability information in the current study. A future study
could utilize eye-movement recording to examine what problem information is being
examined by the participant and how well this data corresponds with the verbal protocols
collected. We would predict that when participants rely for the most part on the story
description for their answers, their corresponding eye-movements will show very few
fixations on numerical probability values. Likewise when participants stop their
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calculation steps too early in the problem solving sequence, we would expect less eyemovement regressions to include prior probability calculations in these later steps.
Base rate neglect is a catchy term for a cognitive bias that can result during
Bayesian reasoning, but it has limited the focus of past research to only examining why
base rate neglect can occur. However, base rate neglect is simply one of many ways that
participants can fail to conduct the normative steps required for solving Bayesian
reasoning problems. The current thesis does not limit itself in this way, and this has
resulted in a much more comprehensive model of the different ways that faulty Bayesian
reasoning can occur. Our model also highlights that prescriptive procedures for
overcoming these faults needs to be tailored to each individual and may require more
than one method to resolve their difficulties.
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Table 1
Bayesian computations, success rates, and correlations with numeracy and cognitive
reasoning measures found by Byun and Ball (2015)
Calculation

Correct
% of
# of
answer Correct Answer

Performance
of Numeracy
Scale

Performance
of
2-item CRT

P(H)

15%

98.2%

2

.02

-.08

P(¬H)

85%

98.2%

2

.02

-.08

P(d|H)

80%

92.7%

5

.26**

.31**

P(d|¬H)

20%

92.7%

5

.17

.27***

P(H) × P(d|H)

12%

60.2%

23

.32*

.24*

P(¬H) × P(d|¬H)

17%

59.3%

20

.49***

.41***

P(H) × P(d|H) + P(¬H)
× P(d|¬H)

29%

31.5%

23

.35***

.33**

P(H|d)

41.38%

3.6%

25

.14

.16

* p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001.
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Figure 1. Total percentage of “other or non-explained” responses that resulted for four
past studies that examined base rate neglect.
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Figure 2. Frequency distribution of answers for a sample of three problems used by Byun
and Ball (2015). Left line indicates base rate probability P(H), middle line indicates
correct Bayesian answer P(H|D), and right line indicates hit rate probability P(D|H).
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Figure 3. Examples of participant responses that highlight consistent probability (i.e.,
smallest inconsistency measure values) based responses (top and center panels) and
inconsistent response patterns (bottom panel) (i.e., highest inconsistency measures).
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Figure 4. Instructions for each of the three Bayesian problems.
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Participant: Um, this one was harder to think about because it kind of depends on the
friend. Because I was just thinking about how to make it real life relatable, so I guess
the 2% of luggage that contains drugs is a really small probability so that I wouldn’t
think that my friend had drugs, but if the dog smelled the drugs I would probably be a
little skeptical, because dogs are right, like I mean sniffer dogs are right 90% of the
time, which is really a lot. And, um, yeah, that’s all. Well it’s weird how they’re right
90% of the time and not right 20% of the time, because that’s more than 100 but, so I
guess that makes it a little less reliable.
Experimenter: So, you said your answer was 70%. How did you come up with 70% as
the answer?
Participant: I just subtracted 90 and 20 because those seemed like the most relevant
numbers, 90% right and 20% wrong so a 70% chance. (Respondent #7)

Figure 5. A sample transcript of verbal protocol. Transcripts are segmented
(underlined) and then coded using the template provided below for each problem.
Calculation processes are depicted on the right side of the coding template and noncalculation processes (e.g., subjective interpretation of value or situation) are depicted
on the left side of the coding template.
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Figure 6. Frequency distribution of answers for three problems used in the current study.
Left line indicates base rate probability P(H), middle line indicates correct Bayesian
answer P(H|D), and right line indicates hit rate probability P(D|H).
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Figure 7. A coded example of a correct Bayesian reasoning strategy.
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Figure 8. A coded example of an incorrect probability-based reasoning strategy where
all the necessary information is utilized, but not correctly. This participant did not add
P(H) + P(H|D) to the denominator for the last step of the Bayesian probability
calculation.
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Figure 9. A coded example of a participant who reduced the four outcomes of the two
combined events to just two outcomes. The participant stops at the conditional
probability calculation as a result of this misperception.
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Figure 10. A coded example of a participant who uses some of the probability
information, but not all of the information required to provide the correct answer.
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Figure 11. A coded example of a strategy involving two sources of information based
on personal intuitive judgments.
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Figure 12. A coded example of the intuition-based reasoning approach. This participant
made their final judgment after subjective interpretation of the story and reflecting on
their own personal experiences.
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Figure 13. A descriptive model of how different Bayesian reasoning answers occur. Each
stage contribute to the unique variability of answers and individuals need different help to
facilitate their Bayesian decision making.
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